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The Difference Between Filing Lawsuits and Selling 
Widgets:  The Lost Understanding that Some Attorneys’ 
Exercise of State Power is Subject to Appropriate 
Regulation 
PAUL TAYLOR* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is often argued that all attorneys practicing in the United States – re-
gardless of the function they perform in the American justice system – are 
purely private actors working in a free market system. 
Senator Orrin Hatch, former Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, for example, in opposing an amendment to legislation that would 
have limited attorneys’ fees, said: 
If we allow ourselves to start dictating what fees have to be paid to 
certain professions in our society, however tempting, then I think 
we are starting down a dangerous road.  How can conservatives 
support setting fees in a free market system? . . .  We should think 
twice before we move toward having the Congress of the United 
States set attorneys' fees.  What is it going to be next?  Accounting 
fees? . . .  Private doctors’ fees? . . .  Should we consider capping 
Jerry Seinfeld’s pay because he makes tens of millions of dollars a 
year . . .?1 
This article examines whether it is true, as Senator Hatch claims, that 
all attorneys in every instance should be equated, as a matter of public pol-
icy, with other private actors. 
This article explores why not all attorneys function in a free market, 
and consequently their renumberation should not always remain unregu-
lated.  Attorneys who file lawsuits can, by simply filing a complaint at 
their unfettered discretion, immediately subject defendants to the threat of 
a default judgment and necessitate their spending money and resources 
toward their defense.  That dynamic results in a situation in which a defen-
  
 * The author is a graduate of Yale College, summa cum laude (1991), and of the Harvard Law 
School, cum laude (1994).  The author is chief counsel to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution.  
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this article are exclusively those of the author, and do not 
represent any official or unofficial position of the House Committee on the Judiciary, any of its sub-
committees, or any of its members. 
 1. 144 Cong. Rec. S5099-5100 (daily ed. May 19, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
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dant will be made to pay any amount to the plaintiff in settlement, provided 
the settlement demanded is less than the defendant’s costs of defense and 
the plaintiff’s attorneys’ costs for filing the case are minimal (as they uni-
versally are).   
This article proceeds to discuss a short history of attorney regulation – 
from Roman times to the present, a story beginning with severe limits on 
attorneys’ influence and ending in a regime of rules that encourage the 
filing of lawsuits and do little to restrain them – and an examination of how 
that breakdown of attorney regulation occurred over time.  This article 
concludes with a discussion of Supreme Court precedents indicating that 
private attorneys who file lawsuits should be considered state actors in 
most circumstances in which they trigger the authority of the state and, 
through the state, the threat of a default judgment and the consequent nec-
essary expenditure of defense costs.  This article concludes that attorneys 
who file lawsuits are qualitatively different than other private actors who 
seek to sell products to willing buyers in a free market system, and hence 
private attorneys who file lawsuits are more appropriately subject to regu-
lation. 
II.  ATTORNEYS’ POWER TO TRIGGER THE THREAT OF DEFAULT 
JUDGMENTS ENFORCED BY THE STATE 
Looking beyond the “officer of the court” label,2 it becomes clear that 
attorneys who file lawsuits have unique powers, as privately paid profes-
  
 2. Historically, there has been at least a rough notion that attorneys are in some sense “officers of 
the court,” and not purely private actors.  In the colonies, the first statute defining the criteria for the 
formal admission of attorneys to practice in Massachusetts was An Act Relating to Attorneys, which 
required an oath of office that included a statement that “you shall use your self in the Office of an 
Attorney . . . with all good Fidelity as well as to the Court as your Clients.” Anton-Hermann Chroust, 
The Rise of the Legal Profession in America: The Colonial Experience vol. 1, 88 (U. of Okla. Press 
1965) (citing Acts and Laws, of Her Majesties Province of the Massachusetts-Bar in New-England 165 
(1714)) (emphasis added).  Since then, the Supreme Court and leading American commentators have 
emphasized the role of attorneys as officers of the court rather than private actors in a free market.  In 
Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866), the Supreme Court stated that “[a]ttorneys and counsellors . . . 
are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order . . . .  From its entry the parties become officers 
of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct . . . .” Id. at 378.  In the same case, 
the Court stated that attorneys are not only subject to judicial supervision, but also to legislative enact-
ment.  According to the Court, “[t]he attorney and counsellor being, by the solemn judicial act of the 
court, clothed with his office, does not hold it as a matter of grace and favor . . . .  The legislature may 
undoubtedly prescribe qualifications for the office, to which he must conform . . . .” Id. at 379.  In Ex 
Parte Bradley, 74 U.S. 364, 374 (1868), the Supreme Court recognized that abusive litigation could 
warrant sanction by courts, stating “[w]e do not doubt the power of the court to punish attorneys as 
officers of the same . . .  [i]f guilty of . . . stirring up litigation by corrupt devices . . . .” Id. at 374.  In 
1953, Roscoe Pound noted that “[t]he legal profession is a public profession. Lawyers are public ser-
vants. They are stewards of all the legal rights and obligations of all the citizens.” Roscoe Pound, The 
Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times vii (West 1953). 
File: Taylor (macro) Created on: 12/20/2005 12:08:00 AM Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:33:00 AM 
2005 FILING LAWSUITS AND SELLING WIDGETS 47 
sionals, to trigger the threat of default judgments enforced by the state.  
Significantly, current law allows attorneys unlimited discretion to choose 
whom to sue.  As one commentator has pointed out:  
The state could require the attorney to submit for ex parte approval 
a proposed defendants list that includes constitutional rationales 
for naming each defendant.  But the courts and legislatures have 
delegated these decisions to attorneys.  By allowing discretion into 
procedural rules, the state grants decisional power to attorneys.  
These grants of discretion substitute the attorney’s decisions for 
those of a judge or other state officer or body.3  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, place no limits on the 
ability or authority of a lawyer to file a complaint.4  Once a complaint is 
filed, the court clerk sends a summons to the plaintiff or their attorney, 
who then serves the summons and a copy of the complaint on the defen-
dant.5  The summons carries with it the threat of a default judgment if the 
defendant does not respond. 
Not only do the rules allow attorneys to sue whomever they choose, 
they allow them to decide on what grounds to sue, the types of damages to 
request, and the amount of money to demand.  The attorney’s unlimited 
discretion to determine the amount sued for has significant consequences 
for defendants.  University of Chicago law professor Cass Sunstein and 
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman have compiled research from studies 
involving more than 8,000 jury-eligible citizens in Illinois, Colorado, 
Texas, Arizona, and Nevada showing that juries give higher awards when 
personal injury attorneys simply demand higher amounts,6 and settlement 
costs can be expected to rise with the threat of higher jury awards. 
Attorneys have this power, yet they are allowed to exercise it for their 
own financial gain.  As Judge Richard Posner has explained, “the legal 
process relies for its administration primarily on private individuals moti-
  
 3. James W. Harper, Attorneys As State Actors: A State Action Model and Argument for Holding 
SLAPP-Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Liable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 405, 423-24 
(1994). 
 4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court). 
 5. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “Summons (a) 
Form. The summons shall be signed by the clerk, bear the seal of the court, identify the court and the 
parties, be directed to the defendant, and state the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney or, if 
unrepresented, of the plaintiff. It shall also state the time within which the defendant must appear and 
defend, and notify the defendant that failure to do so will result in a judgment by default against the 
defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint. The court may allow a summons to be amended. 
(b) Issuance. Upon or after filing the complaint, the plaintiff may present a summons to the clerk for 
signature and seal. If the summons is in proper form, the clerk shall sign, seal, and issue it to the plain-
tiff for service on the defendant. A summons, or a copy of the summons if addressed to multiple defen-
dants, shall be issued for each defendant to be served . . . .”). 
 6. Cass Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide 62 (U. of Chi. Press 2002). 
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vated by economic self-interest rather than on altruists or officials.”7  Con-
sequently, like all other economic actors, attorneys will tend to exploit 
situations to maximize their utility.  One way of doing that, of course, is by 
exploiting the inherent bargaining advantage the state allows them through 
rules authorizing attorneys to sue whomever they want for whatever they 
want, even when a lawsuit has no legal merit.8 
  
 7. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 565 (5th ed., Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1998). 
 8. Rule 11of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require any sanctions at all for the filing 
of frivolous lawsuits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (“the court may . . . impose an appropriate sanction . . . 
.”) (emphasis added).  Further, Rule 11 currently allows attorneys to avoid sanctions for making frivo-
lous claims and demands by withdrawing them within 21 days after a motion for sanctions has been 
filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A) (“A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately 
from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision 
(b).  It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, 
within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the chal-
lenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately cor-
rected.”) (emphasis added).  As Justice Scalia has pointed out, such a rule encourages frivolous law-
suits: “[i]n my view, those who file frivolous suits and pleadings should have no ‘safe harbor.’ The 
Rules should be solicitous of the abused (the courts and the opposing party), and not of the abuser. 
Under the revised Rule, parties will be able to file thoughtless, reckless, and harassing pleadings, secure 
in the knowledge that they have nothing to lose: If objection is raised, they can retreat without penalty.” 
H.R. Rpt. 104-62, at 11-12 (Mar. 1, 1995) (quoting Justice Scalia). 
  Many states’ rules of civil procedure are modeled after Federal Rule 11, and therefore also do 
not require sanctions for the filing of frivolous lawsuits. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 11 (Arkansas), Addition to 
Reporter’s Notes, 1997 Amendment (“The rule has been amended by designating the former text as 
subdivision (a) and by adding new subdivision (b), which is based [on] Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1993 . . .  New subdivision (b) provides that requests for 
sanctions must be made as a separate motion, rather than simply be included as an additional prayer for 
relief in another motion.  The motion for sanctions is not to be filed until at least 21 days, or other such 
period as the court may set, after being served . . . .”); Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.04 (Minnesota), Advisory 
Committee Comments, 2000 Amendments (“Rule 11 is amended to conform completely to the federal 
rule . . . .  On balance, the Committee believes that the amendment to the Rule to conform to its federal 
counterpart makes the most sense, given this Committee’s long-standing preference for minimizing the 
differences between state and federal practice . . .”); N.D. R. Civ. P. 1 (North Dakota), Explanatory 
Note (“As will become readily apparent from a reading of the rules, they are the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure adapted, insofar as practicable, to state practice.”); N.D. R. Civ. P. 11 (North Dakota), Ex-
planatory Note (“Rule 11 was revised, effective March 1, 1996, in response to the 1993 revision of 
Rule 11.”); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 (Tennessee), Advisory Commission Comment to 1995 Amendment 
(“Amended Rule 11 tracks the current federal version.  Sanctions no longer are mandatory, and non-
monetary sanctions are encouraged.  The 21-day safe harbor provision allows otherwise sanctionable 
papers to be withdrawn, thereby escaping sanctions.”); Utah R. Civ. P. 11 (Utah), Advisory Committee 
Note (“The 1997 amendments conform state Rule 11 with Federal Rule 11.”); Vt. R. Civ. P. 11 (Ver-
mont), Reporter’s Notes to 1996 Amendment (“Rule 11 is amended to conform to the 1993 amendment 
of Federal Rule 11.”).  In addition, state courts also often rely on federal court decisions when interpret-
ing their rules. See e.g. Gray v. Washington, 612 A.2d 839, 842 (D.C. 1992); Bryson v. Sullivan, 412 
S.E.2d 327, 332 (N.C. 1992); Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 829 P.2d 1099, 1104-05 (Wash. 1992) (en 
banc).  Sanctions for frivolous filings are also not mandatory in 38 states and the District of Columbia.  
See Ala. R. Civ. P. 11 (Alabama); Alaska R. Civ. P. 11 (Alaska); Ark. R. Civ. P. 11 (Arkansas); 
Cal.C.C.P. § 128.5 (California); C.R.C.P. 11 (Colorado); C.G.S.A. § 52-190a (Connecticut); Del. R. 
Sup. Ct. R. 33 (Delaware); D.C. R. Civ. P. 11 (D.C.); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.150 (Florida); Hi. R. Civ. P. 11 
(Hawaii); Il. C. S. Sup. Ct. R. 137 (Illinois); In. St. Trial Rule 11 (Indiana); La. Civ. Code Ann. Art. 
864 (Louisiana); Me. R. Civ. P. 11 (Maine); Md. Rule 1-311 (Maryland); Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 (Massa-
chusetts); Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03 (Minnesota); Miss. R. Civ. P. 11 (Mississippi); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-
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The incentives for personal injury lawyers to file meritless nuisance 
lawsuits for their settlement value are clear.  As leading commentators 
have described the situation under current law: 
[T]he plaintiff may choose to file a claim at some (presumably 
small) cost.  If the defendant does not then settle with the plaintiff 
and does not, at a cost, defend himself, the plaintiff will prevail by 
default judgment . . . .  Given the model and the assumption that 
each party acts in his financial interest and realizes the other will 
do the same, it is easy to see how nuisance suits can arise.  By fil-
ing a claim, any plaintiff, and thus the plaintiff with a weak case, 
places the defendant in a position where he will be held liable for 
the full judgment demanded unless he defends himself.  Hence, the 
defendant should be willing to pay a positive amount in settlement 
to the plaintiff with a weak case – despite the defendant’s knowl-
edge that were he to defend himself, such a plaintiff would with-
draw.9 
These commentators point out that defendants face a form of extortion 
because “to defeat a claim, the defendant will have to engage in actions 
that are frequently more expensive than the plaintiff’s cost of making the 
claim, for the defendant will have to gather evidence supporting his con-
tention that he was not legally responsible for harm done to the plaintiff or 
that no harm was actually done.”10  The same commentators offer the fol-
lowing illustration: 
Suppose, for instance, that the plaintiff files a claim and demands 
$180 in settlement.  The defendant will then reason as follows.  If 
he settles, his costs will be $180.  If he rejects the demand and 
does not defend himself, he will lose $1000 by default judgment.  
If he rejects the demand and defends himself, the plaintiff will 
withdraw, but he will have spent $200 to accomplish this.  Hence, 
the defendant’s costs are minimized if he accepts the plaintiff’s 
  
55-5 (Mississippi); Mo. S. Ct. R. 55.03 (Missouri); Neb. R. Civ. P. St. § 25-824 (Nebraska); N.H. Sup. 
Ct. R. 59 (New Hamphsire); N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-59.1 (New Jersey); N.M.R. Dist. Ct. R. Civ. P. 1-011 
(New Mexico); N.D. R. Civ. P. 11 (North Dakota); Ohio R. Civ. P. 11 (Ohio); 12 Okl. St. Ann. § 2011 
(Oklahoma); Or. R. Civ. P. 17 (Oregon); Pa. R. Civ. P. 1023.1 (Pennsylvania); Pa. R. Civ. P. 1023.4 
(Pennsylvania); R.I. R. Civ. P. 11 (Rhode Island); S.C. R. Civ. P. 11 (South Carolina); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 
11.03 (Tennessee); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code § 10.004 (Texas); Utah R. Civ. P. 11 (Utah); Vt. 
R. Civ. P. 11 (Vermont); Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:4 (Virginia); Va. Sup. Ct. R. 4:1 (Virginia); Wash. R.Civ. P. 
11 (Washington); W.Va. R. Civ. P. 11 (West Virginia); W.S.A. § 802.05 (Wisconsin); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 
11 (Wyoming). 
 9. D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance Value, 5 Intl. 
Rev. L. & Econ. 3, 3 (June 1985). 
 10. Id. at 10. 
File: Taylor (macro) Created on:  12/20/2005 12:08:00 AM Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:33:00 AM 
50 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 1 
demand for $180; and the same logic shows that he would have 
accepted any demand up to $200.  It follows that the plaintiff will 
find it profitable to file his nuisance claim; indeed, this will be so 
whenever the cost of filing is less than the defendant’s cost of de-
fense.11 
Under this dynamic, when an attorney files a case, the defendant is in a 
lose-lose situation from the beginning: the defendant can either pay the 
costs of defending the case, or lose the case entirely by doing nothing.  All 
cases, simply by virtue of being filed, have an immediate value for the 
plaintiff that creates an inherently superior bargaining position for the 
plaintiff’s attorney.12  Attorneys have the unique power to subject innocent 
individuals to a situation in which simply paying off frivolous claimants 
through monetary settlements is often cheaper than litigating the case.13 
Attorneys know the mere filing of claims immediately subject defen-
dants to significant legal costs of defense, and they will tend to use those 
costs of defense to their advantage.  A legal system that allows attorneys 
unfettered authority to trigger inherent bargaining advantages, simply by 
virtue of their filing a complaint, must also limit attorneys’ ability to ex-
ploit this inherent bargaining advantage for their own personal gain.  As 
leading legal ethics expert Geoffrey Hazard wrote, “[t]he function of law-
yer is closely related to the exercise of government power.  We wish to 
control the exercise of government power through constitutions and laws.  
So also we wish to use constitutions and laws to control the exercise of the 
quasi-governmental power that is exercised through our profession.”14  The 
Supreme Court has also noted the institutionally coercive role lawyers are 
allowed to play in society, stating: 
As an officer of the court, a member of the bar enjoys singular 
powers that others do not possess; by virtue of admission, mem-
bers of the bar share a kind of monopoly granted only to lawyers . . 
  
 11. Id. at 4. 
 12. See Rodulfa v. U.S., 295 F.Supp 28 (D.D.C. 1969) (“[A] person who is successful in litigation is 
a part loser because he has to pay his own expenses and counsel fees . . . .”), appeal dismissed, 461 
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972). 
 13. Opponents of reform often claim that contingency fees – agreements by which personal injury 
attorneys are allowed a percentage cut from any monetary damages awarded to their client – provide a 
screening mechanism that weeds out frivolous cases.  The argument is that personal injury attorneys 
will not take frivolous cases because doing so would leave them with no monetary recovery.  The 
perverse dynamic outlined above, and the fact that filing fees are usually no more than a hundred dol-
lars and additional defendants can be named in the lawsuit at no extra charge, mean that contingency 
fee agreements provide no effective screening mechanism at all, since attorneys can take advantage of 
the legal costs they impose on defendants simply in virtue of their filing a case. 
 14. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Social Responsibility: Journalism, Law, Medicine: The Legal and 
Ethical Position of the Code of Professional Ethics vol. 5, 7 (Louis W. Hodges 1979). 
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. .  [A]s an officer of the court, a lawyer can cause persons to drop 
their private affairs and be called as witnesses in court, and for 
depositions and other pretrial processes that, while subject to the 
ultimate control of the court, may be conducted outside court-
rooms.  The license granted by the court requires members of the 
bar to conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the role of 
courts in the administration of justice.15 
III.  A SHORT HISTORY OF ATTORNEY REGULATION 
Today, the inherent bargaining advantage of those filing lawsuits over 
those defending themselves from lawsuits is virtually unfettered.  How did 
this situation come to be?  A short history of attorney regulations helps 
explain how the current rules governing attorneys have changed over time. 
The history of the regulation of attorneys is a story beginning with se-
vere limits on attorneys’ influence and ending in a regime of rules that not 
only fail to restrain, but encourage, the filing of lawsuits.  Attorneys’ fees 
were heavily regulated in the American Colonial Era and in the Post-
Revolutionary Period.  Then, in the mid-nineteenth century, New York’s 
influential Field Code of Civil Procedure rejected any regulation of attor-
neys’ fees but conceded that a “loser-pays” rule was justified by the costs 
attorneys could impose on innocent victims simply by virtue of filing a 
lawsuit.  In the years that followed, however, fee-shifting provisions mate-
rialized in this country in a manner that benefited plaintiffs only, and not 
defendants.  The result has been an abdication of any significant limits on 
the power of attorneys to file lawsuits, the encouragement of the filing of 
lawsuits through fee-shifting rules that benefit plaintiffs alone, and – with 
the rise of the numbers and influence of attorneys in America – the triumph 
of rules that only create additional demand for attorneys. 
  
 15. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644 (1985).  It should be remembered that, in part because lawyers 
exercise government power, they can be required, despite the First Amendment, to refer the court to 
relevant, material legal authority contrary to their clients’ legal position whenever there is a danger that 
the court might be otherwise misled. See Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 
1993) (“All attorneys, as officers of the court, owe duties of complete candor and primary loyalty to the 
court before which they practice.  An attorney’s duty to a client can never outweigh his or her responsi-
bility to see that our system of justice functions smoothly.  This concept is as old as common law 
jurisprudence itself.”).  Lawyers also have responsibilities that require them to perform certain services, 
as they can be made to represent the indigent when appointed by the court, even without fee when 
necessary. See State v. Delaney, 332 P.2d 71, 80 (Or. 1960). 
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A. The Fear that Attorneys Would Abuse Their State Power Permeated the 
Colonial and Post- Revolutionary Period. 
The understanding that attorneys can exercise state power – and the 
fear that power would be abused – has ancient roots, as do laws seeking to 
limit such abuse.  In ancient Rome,16 Tacitus described how the emperor 
Claudius fixed maximum attorneys’ fees at ten thousand sesterces because 
attorneys were considered to be doing the work of the state.17  Justinian in 
his Digests maintained the law limiting attorneys’ fees, and further banned 
contingency fees entirely.18   
Since then, European law relied significantly on Roman law, and limits 
on attorneys’ fees remained the norm in Europe throughout its history,19 
and later in America, driven largely by attorneys’ potential to abuse the 
litigation system.  During the American Colonial period, lawyers were 
roundly despised.  According to one historian, “[i]n every one of the Colo-
nies, practically throughout the Seventeenth Century, a lawyer or attorney 
was a character of disrepute and of suspicion . . . .  In many Colonies, per-
sons acting as attorneys were forbidden to receive any fee . . . in all, they 
were subjected to the most rigid restrictions as to fees and procedure.”20  
Early American observer Benjamin Austin wrote, "if we look through the 
different counties throughout the Commonwealth, we shall find that the 
troubles of the people arise principally from debts enormously swelled by 
tedious law-suits." 21  The Duc de La Rochefoucauld similarly observed, 
“[t]he . . . inhabitants of New England.  They are said to be very litigious . . 
. .  [T]here are, indeed, few disputes, even of the most trivial nature, among 
them, that can be terminated elsewhere than before a court of justice.”22  
As one historian summarized the situation in early America, “[l]awsuits 
were often begun or continued for no other purpose than to embarrass an 
  
 16. There was no clearly defined role for a legal advocate until the profession began to emerge in 
ancient Rome, approximately 2000 years ago. See William Forsyth, The History of Lawyers, Ancient 
and Modern 13-15, 20-26, 80-92 (1875). 
 17. See Pound, supra n. 2, at 53 (describing understanding in ancient Rome that lawyers did “the 
work of the state”). 
 18. The law stated “Ille piraticus mos est,” meaning contingency fees were considered “the moral of 
a pirate.” Forsyth, supra n. 16, at 3; Suetonius, Nero 17, Liba. 1, § 12. 
 19. In medieval times, an “undue eagerness” for attorneys’ fees was not only deemed uncouth, but 
provided grounds for disbarment. See Forsyth, supra n. 16, at 365 (“Among the capitularies of Charle-
magne there are regulations concerning the conduct of advocates or ‘clamorers’ (clamatores), as they 
are there called; as, for instance, that if they were discovered to be influenced by an undue eagerness 
for money in the causes they undertook, they were to be banished from the society of honorable per-
sons, and to be, in fact, disbarred (Cap. vii, tit. 114).”). 
 20. Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar 4 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1913). 
 21. Benjamin Austin, Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the Law 4 (1786). 
 22. La Rochefoucauld, Travels through the United States of America 536 (St. Paul’s Church Yard 
1799). 
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enemy by making him incur legal costs.”23  And as John Adams observed 
of the notoriously litigious town of Braintree, Massachusetts, “[t]hese dirty 
and ridiculous litigations have been multiplied, in this town, till the very 
earth groans and the stones cry out.  The town has become infamous for 
them throughout the country.”24  Popular journalist William Duane of 
Philadelphia, wrote a pamphlet arguing that abusive litigation practices by 
lawyers “demand the more serious interference of the legislature, and the 
jealousy of the people” because lawyers “so manage justice as to engross 
the general property to themselves, through the medium of litigation . . . 
.”25 
Attorneys were so despised in early America that they often inspired 
violence.  As one historian wrote: 
During Shay’s Rebellion, in 1786 people actually demanded that 
all inferior courts and all lawyers be entirely eliminated . . . .  In 
Vermont and New Hampshire vociferous demands were made to 
suppress the legal profession completely, or at least to reduce the 
number of lawyers and, incidentally, to cut down substantially the 
usual legal fees.  In Vermont, where the general populace was par-
ticularly vehement in its actions and denouncements, courthouses 
were set afire . . . . As early as 1786 the town of Braintree, Massa-
chusetts, passed a resolve “to crush . . . that order of Gentlemen 
denominated Lawyers . . . whose . . . conduct appears . . . to tend 
rather to the destruction than the preservation of this Common-
wealth.”26 
Fear that the legal profession would abuse its power to generate law-
suits was also reflected in limits on attorneys’ fees.  In 1711, maximum 
attorneys’ fees in Pennsylvania were set at twelve shillings.27  The same 
year in Connecticut attorneys’ fees were set at four shillings in the County 
Court, and at eight shillings in the Superior Court.28  Later, in 1784, Con-
necticut by statute limited attorneys’ fees according to a “Table of Fees.”29  
In 1792, Georgia regulated attorneys’ fees as follows: for “each cause com-
  
 23. Chroust, supra n. 2, at 82. 
 24. John Quincy Adams, Works of John Adams vol. 2, 90 (1850). 
 25. William Duane, Sampson Against the Philistines 22 (1805). 
 26. Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America: The Revolution and the 
Post-Revolutionary Era vol. 2, 26-27 (U. of Okla. Press 1965) (citing Laws and Resolves of Mass., c. 
23, § 2, (1785); John Adams, The Adams Papers: Diary and Autobiography of John Adams vol. 1, 342 
(1902); John Quincy Adams, Three Episodes of Massachusetts History 897 (1893)). 
 27. An Act for Regulating and Establishing Fees, 2 Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, c. 169, § 1, 
331, 344-45 (1896). 
 28. Chroust, supra n. 2, at 119 (citing An Act for the Better Regulating Proceedings and Pleas at the 
Bar, Acts and Laws of His Majesties’ English Colony of Connecticut in New England 61 (1750)).  
 29. Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut in America 10-11 (1784). 
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menced and tried in the superior or inferior courts,” eighteen shillings and 
eight pence.30 In 1714, Massachusetts fixed attorneys’ fees at twelve shil-
lings “at the superiour court of judicature . . . and at the inferiour court, ten 
shillings, and no more.”31  In 1719, Rhode Island attorneys’ fees were fixed 
at a maximum of twelve shillings.32  In 1766 these fees were reduced to a 
maximum of five shillings.33  By 1748, the New Jersey Legislature passed 
a statute establishing an elaborate schedule of lawyer’s fees.34  In 1778, in 
Virginia, attorneys’ fees were fixed by statute in the General Court and the 
High Court of Chancery depending on the nature of the action.35  In 1795, 
in Pennsylvania, attorneys’ fees in the Court of Common Pleas were set for 
filing a lawsuit and entering an appearance as follows: “if the suit is ended 
before or during the sitting of the first court,” at $1.67; for every suit 
“ended after the first court and before judgment,” $3.34; and for “every 
suit prosecuted to judgment,” $4.00.36  In 1801, New York enacted the 
comprehensive Act Regulating the Fees of Several Officers and Ministers 
of Justice within the State, which included limits on attorneys’ fees.37  In 
1810, in Maryland, a statute was enacted providing “no attorney of any of 
the county courts shall be authorized to charge more . . . than the sum of 
three dollars and thirty-three cents and one third of a cent in any one 
suit.”38 
Some states provided particular fee limits directed at those filing ac-
tions or appeals.  New Hampshire, in 1791, passed the Act Regulating Fees 
which provided that in the Court of Common Pleas, attorneys’ fees for 
filing the plaintiff’s writ of declaration were 8 shillings; for the petitioner’s 
complaint or petition to the Court of General Sessions of the Peace, 8 shil-
lings; for every complaint entered in the Superior Court, 8 shillings; and 
for drawing a writ “triable” before a justice of the peace, 3 shillings.39  At-
torney’s fees were set by statute in Rhode Island in 1798 and again in 1822 
  
 30. A Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia 476 (1800). 
 31. Acts and Laws, of Her Majesties Province of the Massachusetts-Bar in New-England 185 
(1714). 
 32. Charter Granted by His Majesty King Charles the Second to the Colony of Rhode Island and 
Providence-Plantations in America 21 (1719). 
 33. Acts and Laws of His Majesty’s Colony of Rhode-Island and Providence-Plantations in America 
98 (1767). 
 34. The Acts of the General Assembly of the Province of New-Jersey 167 (Allinson ed. 1776). 
 35. Chroust, supra n. 26, at 261-62 (citing 9 Statutes at Large of Virginia 529 (Hening ed. 1823)). 
 36. 15 Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, c. 1863, § 1, 360 (1911). 
 37. 5 Laws of the State of New York Passed at the Session of the Legislature Held in the Year 1801, 
c. 190, 553-71 (1871). 
 38. Laws of Maryland of 1810, c. 126, § 2; 1 The General Public Statutory Law of Maryland 601 
(1840). 
 39. Chroust, supra n. 26, at 244 (citing The Laws of the State of New-Hampshire 118-20 (1792)). 
These fee tables were redrawn according to the new American currency in 1796.  See Chroust, supra n. 
26, at 244 (citing Constitution and Laws of the State of New-Hampshire 116 (1805)).  
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at the following rates: for filing a writ of declaration, one dollar; for entry 
of every action in the Supreme Court, three dollars; and for the filing of 
every petition in the Supreme Court, two dollars.40  New Jersey in 1799 
passed legislation that limited attorneys’ fees for every declaration, plea, or 
pleading to $0.70.41  Delaware had its own unique method for reducing 
litigiousness.  In 1793, Delaware passed the Act for Regulating and Estab-
lishing Fees providing that for all pleadings in an action subsequent to a 
declaration, the fee would be one cent for every written line, twelve words 
to a line.42 
B. The Relaxation of Attorney Regulation Was Ushered in by the Field 
Code in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, and the Abandonment of Attorney 
Regulation Occurred through One-Way Fee Shifting Statutes in the 
Twentieth Century. 
Statutory limits on attorneys’ fees prevailed until the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Then, in 1848, the Field Code43 of Civil Procedure that governed 
practice in New York struck down all provisions “establishing or regulat-
ing the costs or fees of attorneys” and provided that “hereafter the measure 
of such compensation shall be left to the agreement, express or implied, of 
the parties.”44 
The report recommending the Field Code embraced the notion that at-
torneys are purely private actors.  The report stated “[i]f it be said, that the 
attorney is an officer, admitted to the courts, and therefore, in a position 
different from the others, we answer, that he is not a public officer, chosen 
to perform public duties.  He is admitted to practice in the courts, for pri-
vate purposes, and on behalf of private persons.  He is, in every respect, a 
private agent . . . .”45  However, the report promptly conceded that attor-
neys, even if considered private actors, could abuse the state power they 
were allowed to exercise when it stated “[w]e propose to . . . place the law 
  
 40. Chroust, supra n. 26, at 241 (citing The Public Laws of the State of Rhode Island 222-23 (1798); 
The Public Laws of the State of Rhode Island 171-72 (1822)). 
 41. Chroust, supra n. 26, at 255 (citing Laws of the State of New-Jersey 481-94 (1821)). 
 42. Chroust, supra n. 26, at 256 (citing 2 Laws of the State of Delaware 1116, c. 27 (1797)). 
 43. The code is named after legal reformer David Dudley Field. 
 44. Laws of the State of New York § 258 (1848).  The Court of Appeals of New York considered 
these changes for the worse, stating in one opinion that “Section 303 of the Code . . . abrogates all rules 
and provisions of law which might restrain an attorney in agreeing with his client for the measure or 
mode of his compensation, and it leaves such compensation to the agreement of the parties, express or 
implied. What was before not only illegal but disreputable is now lawful, if not respectable.” Rooney v. 
Second Ave. R.R. Co., 18 N.Y. 368, 373 (N.Y. 1858).  At approximately the same time, Virginia ended 
its regime of attorneys’ fees regulation.  See John B. Minor, Institutes of Common and Statute Law vol. 
4, 200-04, 213-14 (3d ed. 1893). 
 45. First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleading, Code of Procedure 205 (1848). 
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on its proper footing, of indemnity to the party, whom an unjust adversary 
has forced into litigation . . . .  The losing party, ought however, as a gen-
eral rule, to pay the expense of the litigation.  He has caused a loss to his 
adversary, unjustly, and should indemnify him for it.”46  The report’s sup-
port for a “loser-pays” provision demonstrates that the legal system contin-
ued to be understood as prone to abuse by those triggering state power 
against the innocent victims of lawsuits.  The Field Code supported both 
unregulated attorneys’ fees and a loser-pays rule that would apply to both 
plaintiffs and defendants. 
The Field Code was widely influential.  By 1870, at least twenty-four 
states had adopted some version of it.47  Not only did the Field Code usher 
in a regime in which all attorneys’ fees were left largely unregulated, it 
also spurred a trend in the law toward loser-pays provisions.  However, 
while a trend toward a loser-pays rule developed in certain parts of the law, 
it was a trend that acted solely to the plaintiff’s benefit, contrary to the 
recommendation of the Field Code’s authors. 
Three federal statutes – voting rights legislation in 1870, the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887, and the Sherman Act of 1890 – allowed successful 
plaintiffs, but not successful defendants, to recover their legal expenses.48  
Various state laws followed suit.49  The one-way attorneys’ fees shifting 
statutes were in the fashion of the Progressive Era, namely tools to encour-
age attorneys to file lawsuits on behalf of poorer plaintiffs against certain 
large corporations.50  Such state statutes allowing the award of attorneys’ 
  
 46. Id. at 206.  Rules requiring losing plaintiffs to pay the fees of the defendant’s attorney had ex-
isted in America since its early days.  In 1792, for example, Georgia regulated attorneys’ fees and 
provided that “[w]here the defendant prevails, [he was] to receive the fee in lieu of the plaintiff’s attor-
ney.” A Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia 476 (1800). 
 47. See C. Hepburn, The Historical Development of Code Pleading in America and England 84-117 
(W.H. Anderson & Co. 1897). 
 48. Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140, §§ 2-3, repealed by Act of February 8, 1894, 28 Stat. 36; Act 
of February 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379, § 8; Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 210, § 7 (1890). 
 49. See Act of May 2, 1873, 1873 Ill. Pub. Laws 135, 138 and 1874 Minn. Gen. Laws, c. 26, § 15 
(requiring railroads to pay legal fees when found liable for charging unlawful rates); 1874 Kan. Sess. 
Laws, c. 94; 1875 Minn. Laws, c. 98, § 5 (requiring railroads to pay legal fees when found liable for 
harming livestock); 1866 Pa. Laws, c. 106 (corporations liable for fees when bondholders made to sue 
to collect interest on bonds previously held valid); 11 A.L.R. 884 (1921) (collecting statutes providing 
for attorneys’ fees in suits against insurance companies). 
 50. As state legislatures and Congress allowed the contingency fee and one-way fee-shifting statutes 
to replace regulations limiting attorneys’ fees, many prominent legal scholars foresaw a rise in lawsuits 
filed for their nuisance value.  Judge Cooley feared a rise in frivolous negligence lawsuits against 
corporations.  See E. Countryman, The Ethics of Compensation for Professional Services 24 (W. C. 
Little & Co. 1882) (quoting Judge Cooley as having written that many negligence actions “are often 
taken as mere ventures – as one might invest in a lottery ticket, or in the exploration of an unknown 
land for possible mineral wealth.”).  Judge Cooley also opposed the contingency fee, writing “[t]he 
lawyer’s legitimate fee is payable irrespective of the result, and any contingent interest in the event of 
the litigation is necessarily corrupting.” Otto C. Sommerich, The History and Development of Attor-
neys’ Fees, 6 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 363, 369 (1951).  
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fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs covered claims against carriers for 
freight,51 and claims against life and fire insurance companies on insurance 
policies.52 
At first, legislation that made corporations alone pay the costs of litiga-
tion regarding successful claims against them for the payment of labor 
rendered, overcharges, or the injury of livestock, was struck down by the 
Supreme Court as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.53  However, 
when such legislation was amended to make “any person or corporation” 
liable for successful plaintiff’s costs of litigation for the same class of 
claims, it was sustained as a “police regulation designed to promote the 
prompt payment of small claims.”54 
  
Moorefield Storey also wrote that “[u]nder existing law it costs little to start a groundless suit, in order 
to frighten an adversary or take a speculative chance of getting a settlement.” Moorefield Storey, The 
Reform of Legal Procedure 35 (Yale U. Press 1911). 
 51. See Mo., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642 (1914); A. Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Coachman, 52 
So. 377 (Fla. 1910); Mo. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Simson, 68 Pac. 653 (Kan. 1902); Smith v. Chicago, St. P. 
M. & O. Ry. Co., 157 N.W. 622 (Neb. 1916).  
 52. See Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308 (1902); Ark. Ins. Co. v. McManus, 110 
S.W. 797 (Ark. 1908); Tillis v. Liverpool L. & G. Ins. Co., 35 So. 171 (Fla. 1903); Harp v. Fireman’s 
Fund Ins. Co., 61 S.E. 704 (Ga. 1908); British Am. Assur. Co. v. Bradford, 55 Pac. 335 (Kan. 1898); 
Keller v. Home Life Ins. Co., 95 S.W. 903 (Mo. 1906); Johnson v. St. P. F. & M. Ins. Co., 178 N.W. 
926 (Neb. 1920); Union C.L. Ins. Co. v. Chowning, 26 S.W. 982 (Tex. 1894). 
 53. See Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 153 (1897) (holding the challenged statute 
“is simply a statute imposing a penalty upon railroad corporations for a failure to pay certain debts.  No 
individuals are thus punished, and no other corporations . . . .  If litigation terminates adversely to them, 
they are mulcted in the attorney's fees of the successful plaintiff; if it terminates in their favor, they 
recover no attorney's fees . . . .  They must pay attorney's fees if wrong. They do not recover any if 
right; while their adversaries recover if right, and pay nothing if wrong. In the suits, therefore, to which 
they are parties, they are discriminated against, and are not treated as others. They do not stand equal 
before the law. They do not receive its equal protection. All this is obvious from a mere inspection of 
the statute.”). 
 54. Mo., K., & T. Ry. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 649 (1914). 
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By the 1960's, nearly all major civil rights55 and environmental stat-
utes56 included one-way fee-shifting provisions.  Other statutes brought 
whole areas of litigation under the one-way fee-shifting rule.57  By the 
1980's, the Supreme Court went even further by reading one-way fee-
shifting statutes broadly58 and encouraging enforcement under such stat-
utes in a way that tended to grant fees to prevailing plaintiffs while deny-
ing them to prevailing defendants.59 
  
 55. See, e.g. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (2005) (“In any action [for 
discrimination in public accommodations] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . 
. reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . .”); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §  2000e-5(k) 
(2005) (“In any action [for denial of equal employment opportunities] the court, in its discretion, may 
allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . .”); Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2005) (“On a claim in which an individual proves a 
violation under section 703(m) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)] and a respondent demonstrates that the re-
spondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the 
court – (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attor-
ney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of the claim under 
section 703(m) . . . .”); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2005) 
(“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977, 1977A, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 
1981 of the revised statutes, title IX of Public Law 92-318, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, or section 40302 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, the court, in its discretion, may 
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee . . . .”); Civil Rights 
of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(b) (2005) (“In any action commenced under this 
section, the court may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's 
fee against the United States as part of the costs.”); 42 U.S.C. § 1997c(d) (2005) ("In any action in 
which the United States joins as an intervenor under this section, the court may allow the prevailing 
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee against the United States as part of the 
costs . . . .”). 
 56. See e.g. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2005) (allowing the court to award costs including 
reasonable attorney's fees); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C § 1365(d) (2005) (“The court, in issuing a final 
order in any action [for violation of the Clean Water Act], may award costs of litigation (including 
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, when-
ever the court determines such award is appropriate.”).  
 57. See Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976); 
Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2321 (1980). 
 58. See e.g. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974). 
 59. See e.g. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420-22 (1978).  In Christianburg, 
the Supreme Court held that, even though the statute on its face provided “no indication whatever of 
the circumstances under which either a plaintiff or defendant should be entitled to attorney’s fees,” an 
award of attorneys’ fees may be made to a successful defendant, rather than a successful plaintiff, in a 
Title VII action only if the court found that the plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or with-
out foundation.” Id. at 418, 421.  This was because “Congress wanted to clear the way for suits to be 
brought under [Title VII]” in a manner that did not unduly stifle plaintiff’s incentives to bring such 
claims. See id. at 412, 420 (“To take the further step of assessing attorney's fees against plaintiffs 
simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litiga-
tion and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions 
of Title VII.”).  The Court elaborated in Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980), that for a defendant to 
benefit from cost-shifting, “[t]he plaintiff’s action must be meritless in the sense that it is groundless or 
without foundation.  The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient 
justification for the assessment of fees.” 
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The result today is that, while one-way fee shifting rules govern in 
fields of litigation in which the plaintiff tends to sue for injunctive rather 
than monetary relief,60 the field of personal injury in tort for money dam-
ages is left unregulated by either limits on attorneys’ fees or a “loser-pays” 
rule.61  An explanation as to why may lie in the fact that, over the years, the 
number of attorneys has risen dramatically, and with it the power of those 
pressing for a regime expanding the demand for lawyers and opposing any 
proposals for rules that might tend to reduce that demand.62  “The number 
of lawyers in the United States per thousand population nearly tripled be-
tween 1970 and 1998, largely in response to the widening role of govern-
ment and a boom in litigation.”63  As one commentator noted in 1981, 
“[t]he most significant response [of attorneys] to the erosion of supply con-
trol . . . has been a redirection of professional energies toward strategies of 
demand creation.”64  As the number of lawyers rose, so did the need to 
create additional demand for lawyers, and one-way, pro-plaintiff fee-
shifting statutes and a system of unregulated attorneys’ fees did just that.65 
  
 60. See O. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 4 (1978). 
 61. Although common law allows courts to award attorneys’ fees to a party when their opponent has 
acted in “bad faith,” a fee award under the bad faith exception requires subjective bad faith, and “some 
proof of malice entirely apart from inferences arising from the possible frivolous character of a particu-
lar claim” is necessary. Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 1044 (1980) compare with Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (awarding attorneys’ fees where the 
opponent acted in bad faith).  Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, entitled “Offer of Judg-
ment,” does not help defendants.  Federal Rule 68 currently provides that any party defending a claim 
may make a settlement offer to the plaintiff.  If the plaintiff rejects the offer and does not receive a 
more favorable judgment at trial, he must pay the defendant’s court costs and fees incurred after the 
date of the offer.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 (“At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party 
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken 
against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs 
then accrued . . . .  If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, 
the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer . . . .”).  The underlying principle 
of Rule 68 is that if the plaintiff rejects an offer that turns out to be more favorable than what they 
receive in a final judgment, they should be made to pay something to compensate the defendant for the 
defense expenses incurred in what turns out to be an unnecessary trial.  However, the Supreme Court, 
in Delta Air Lines v. August, held that a defendant cannot invoke Rule 68 cost shifting if it prevails on 
liability because as currently written Rule 68 only allows costs to be recovered when a judgment is 
“finally obtained by the offeree,” and the offeree, of course, would be the plaintiff. See 450 U.S. 346, 
351-52 (1981) (“[T]he plain language of Rule 68 confines its effect to . . . [cases] in which the plaintiff 
has obtained a judgment” which is for less than the offer of judgment and “it is clear that [Rule 68] 
applies only to offers made by the defendant and only to judgments obtained by the plaintiff.”). 
 62. The more lawsuits that are filed, of course, the more work there is for attorneys representing 
defendants as well. 
 63. Theodore Caplow, Louis Hicks & Ben J. Wattenberg, The First Measured Century: An Illus-
trated Guide to Trends in America, 1900-2000 30 (AEI Press 2001). 
 64. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639, 657 
(1981). 
 65. In England, there was a similar reservation of litigation costs, including some or all attorneys’ 
fees, to successful plaintiffs but not successful defendants very early in English legal history.  How-
ever, that situation in England was eventually corrected.  The first statute that awarded plaintiffs their 
costs, which governed in England until 1875, was the Statute of Gloucester, see 6 Edw. I, c. 1 (1278), 
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IV.  THE TREND OF RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS POINTS TO AN 
UNDERSTANDING THAT ATTORNEYS FILING LAWSUITS EXERCISE STATE 
POWER, AND CUTS AGAINST CURRENT POLICIES UNDER WHICH SUCH 
ATTORNEYS ARE SUBJECT TO LITTLE OR NO REGULATION 
While the policy status quo subjects attorneys who file lawsuits to little 
or no regulation, recent Supreme Court precedents point to an understand-
ing that attorneys who file lawsuits exercise state power and are the appro-
priate subjects of regulations limiting the power of the state.  The key ques-
tion the Supreme Court has asked in inquiries regarding whether actions 
constitute “state action” is whether there is a “sufficiently close nexus” 
between the state and the challenged conduct of the nominally private 
party such that the conduct can fairly be attributed to the state.66  That is a 
fact-specific inquiry, as the Supreme Court has noted: “Only by sifting 
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the 
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.”67 
State action exists as a result of a private party’s “mak[ing] use of state 
procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials.”68  An 
early description of the state action doctrine appeared in 1880 in Ex parte 
Virginia.69  There, the Court declared:  
[T]he prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed to 
the States . . . . They have reference to actions of the political body 
denominated a State, by whatever instruments or in whatever 
modes that action may be taken.  A State acts by its legislative, its 
executive, or its judicial authorities . . . . The constitutional provi-
sion, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the of-
  
enacted in 1278, which provided that in certain cases “the Demandant may recover against the Tenant 
the Costs of his Writ purchased, together with [specified] damages.” Id.  The law awarding costs to 
successful defendants evolved more slowly.  In 1531, defendants were allowed costs in certain actions 
such as trespass, contract, and covenant, see 23 Hen. VIII, c. 15 (1531), and in 1606 a statute was 
enacted that provided a defendant could recover costs in all cases in which the plaintiff could have 
them if the plaintiff recovered. See 4 Jac. I, c. 3 (1606).  In 1875, the First Schedule to the Supreme 
Court of Judicature Act granted the courts discretion to award litigation costs to either party, providing 
that, with certain exceptions, “the costs of and incident to all proceedings in the High Court shall be in 
the discretion of the Court.” 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77 (1875).  Since the fee-shifting rule in England oper-
ates to the benefit of both successful plaintiffs and defendants, there is a much lower demand for attor-
neys there compared to the United States.  Today, the United States, compared to England, has a much 
larger number of lawyers per capita, and at the same time American attorneys charge higher fees and 
earn higher incomes than their English counterparts. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How 
the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 984 (2000). 
 66. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
 67. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
 68. Tulsa Collection Services v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988). 
 69. 100 U.S. 339 (1880). 
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ficers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.70 
In Home Telephone & Telegraph Company v. City of Los Angeles,71 
the Supreme Court extended the state action doctrine, holding that actions 
not authorized by the state remain state action if taken under the appear-
ance of state authority: “[w]here an officer or other representative of a 
State in the exercise of the authority with which he is clothed misuses the 
power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
inquiry concerning whether the state has authorized the wrong is irrelevant 
. . . .”72 
More recently, in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. 
Pope,73 the Supreme Court held that when private parties make use of state 
procedures with overt, significant assistance of state officials, state action 
may be found.74  In that case, a state statute provided that claims on an 
estate had to be made within a certain period of time after the court ap-
pointed the executor or executrix of the estate, at which time notice had to 
be given to potential creditors.75  The Court held that the notice procedures 
constituted state action, even though it was a private party initiating the 
state procedure.76  As the Court stated, “when private parties make use of 
state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials, 
state action may be found.”77  A private attorneys’ filing of complaints 
triggering the threat of default judgments unless defendants expend money 
to defend themselves should also be considered state action under this 
analysis.78 
Shortly after the Court decided Pope, it decided West v. Atkins,79 in 
which it further extended the state action doctrine to cover private profes-
sionals contracted out to provide services to the state.80  In that case, the 
Court held that a private physician who contracted with a state prison to 
attend to an inmate’s medical needs was a state actor.81  The Court held 
that:  
  
 70. Id. at 346-47. 
 71. 227 U.S. 278 (1913). 
 72. Id. at 287. 
 73. 485 U.S. at 478. 
 74. Id. at 486. 
 75. Id. at 481. 
 76. Id. at 488. 
 77. Id. at 486. 
 78. See also Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969) (holding that the 
triggering of a state garnishment statute was state action, and pointing to the monetary harm caused the 
garnishee, including “often . . . the loss of a job” and a “great drain on family income”). 
 79. 487 U.S. 42 (1988). 
 80. Id. at 57. 
 81. Id. at 44, 57. 
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Under state law, the only medical care West could receive for his 
injury was that provided by the State.  If Doctor Atkins misused 
his power by demonstrating deliberate indifference to West's seri-
ous medical needs, the resultant deprivation was caused, in the 
sense relevant for state-action inquiry, by the State's exercise of its 
right to punish West by incarceration and to deny him a venue in-
dependent of the State to obtain needed medical care.82  
Therefore, even when the state “privatizes” medical care for inmates, the 
medical practitioners contracting with the state appropriately can be con-
sidered state actors.  Consequently, even if attorneys filing lawsuits are 
considered “private” operators in the civil justice system – as they surely 
are, operating as they do to save the state the resources that would other-
wise be necessary to enforce civil tort claims83 – they can be considered to 
be exercising state power. 
The line of cases involving prejudgment attachment, garnishment, and 
peremptory challenges84 makes it increasingly clear that attorneys filing 
lawsuits exercise state power.  Regarding prejudgment attachment and 
garnishment, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, Inc.,85 a prejudgment 
attachment procedure required only that someone allege, in an ex parte 
petition, a belief that someone else was disposing of or might dispose of 
their property in order to defeat his creditors.86  Acting on such a petition, a 
clerk of the state court would then issue a writ of attachment, which was 
then executed by the County Sheriff.87  In the case the Court considered, 
“thirty-four days after the [attachment] a state trial judge ordered the at-
tachment dismissed because [the petitioner] had failed to establish the 
statutory grounds for attachment alleged in the petition.”88  The Supreme 
Court noted that it “has consistently held that constitutional requirements 
of due process apply to garnishment and prejudgment attachment proce-
dures whenever officers of the State act jointly with a creditor in securing 
  
 82. Id. at 55. 
 83. See Posner, supra n.7, at 566 (noting that under the American civil justice system, “[t]he state is 
thereby enabled to dispense with a police force to protect people’s common law rights, public attorneys 
to enforce them, and other bureaucratic personnel to operate the system . . . .  The number of public 
employees involved in the protection of private rights of action is remarkably small considering the 
amount of activity regulated by the laws creating those rights . . . .”). 
 84. A challenge is “[a] party’s request that a judge disqualify a potential juror or an entire jury 
panel.”  A peremptory challenge is “[o]ne of a party’s limited number of challenges that do not need to 
be supported by a reason unless the opposing party makes a prima facie showing that the challenge was 
used to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed., West 
2004). 
 85. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). 
 86. Id. at 924. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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the property in dispute.”89 Such joint action occurs “when the State has 
created a system whereby state officials will attach property on the ex parte 
application of one party to a private dispute.”90 
Just like the prejudgment attachment proceeding at issue in Lugar, an 
attorney filing a complaint acts in an ex parte manner with unlimited dis-
cretion, subject to no prior approval by a court or anyone else.  Indeed, the 
significance of Lugar to the status of private attorneys exercising state 
power and demanding relief was not lost on Chief Justice Burger, who 
pointed out in his dissent in the case that “[t]his case is no different from 
the situation in which a private party commences a lawsuit and secures 
injunctive relief which, even if temporary, may cause significant injury to 
the defendant.”91  Under this understanding, a private party that com-
mences a lawsuit, even if the lawsuit is short lived, can still cause signifi-
cant injury to a defendant by exercising state power and triggering the 
threat of a default judgment – and the consequent necessary expenditure of 
defense costs – to pressure settlements. 
Further, the Supreme Court, in Wyatt v. Cole,92 held that qualified im-
munity is not available to private defendants charged with liability under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for invoking state replevin, garnishment, or attachment 
statutes.93  In doing so, the Court stated: 
Respondents do not contend that private parties who instituted at-
tachment proceedings and who were subsequently sued for mali-
cious prosecution or abuse of process were entitled to absolute 
immunity.  And with good reason; although public prosecutors and 
judges were accorded absolute immunity at common law, such 
protection did not extend to complaining witnesses who, like re-
spondents, set the wheels of government in motion by instigating a 
legal action.94   
A procedure in which private actors can trigger a state-enforced attachment 
of property is directly analogous to a procedure in which private actors can 
file a civil lawsuit with the consequent threat of a state-enforced default 
judgment: filing a civil lawsuit “sets the wheels of government in motion” 
by immediately threatening a defendant with a default judgment enforced 
by the state. 
  
 89. Id. at 932-33. 
 90. Id. at 942. 
 91. Id. at 943 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 92. 504 U.S. 158 (1992). 
 93. Id. at 168-69. 
 94. Id. at 164-65 (1992) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
File: Taylor (macro) Created on:  12/20/2005 12:08:00 AM Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:33:00 AM 
64 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 1 
Regarding peremptory challenges, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Company, Inc.,95 the Supreme Court addressed whether it constituted state 
action for a private defense attorney to strike all black persons from a jury 
in a civil case.96  The Court stated:  
We begin our discussion within the framework for state-action 
analysis set forth in Lugar . . . .  We asked first whether the 
claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a 
right or privilege having its source in state authority; and second, 
whether the private party charged with the deprivation could be 
described in all fairness as a state actor.  There can be no question 
that the first part of the Lugar inquiry is satisfied here. By their 
very nature, peremptory challenges have no significance outside a 
court of law.97  
The Court continued that “peremptory challenges have no utility outside 
the jury system, a system which the government alone administers . . . .  
Without the direct and indispensable participation of the judge, who be-
yond all question is a state actor, the peremptory challenge system would 
serve no purpose.”98  The same of course is true of filing a civil complaint, 
which would have no utility outside a system in which a court’s enforce-
ment of a default judgment makes filing a lawsuit worthwhile.99 
The Court continued in Edmonson that “[i]n determining [private de-
fense attorneys’] state-actor status, we next consider whether the action in 
question involves the performance of a traditional function of the govern-
ment.  A traditional function of government is evident here.  The peremp-
tory challenge is used in selecting an entity that is a quintessential govern-
  
 95. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
 96. Id. at 616. 
 97. Id. at 620. 
 98. Id. at 623-24 (quotations and citations omitted).  Neither federal nor state law allows an attorney 
to order a prospective juror to leave the jury box. If, where a judge, in response to the exercise by a 
private attorney of a race-based peremptory challenge, directs a black juror to leave, and the judge’s 
order is state action, then surely there is also state action where a judge, in response to the filing of a 
complaint, directs a defendant to answer for a default judgment, since neither federal nor state law 
allows an attorney to order an answer to a default judgment. 
 99. The Supreme Court has made distinctions in state actor status based on whether an attorney is in 
an adversarial position in relation to the government. See id. at 626-27 (“We find respondent's reliance 
on Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, . . . (1981), unavailing.  In that case, we held that a public 
defender is not a state actor in his general representation of a criminal defendant, even though he may 
be in his performance of other official duties.  While recognizing the employment relation between the 
public defender and the government, we noted that the relation is otherwise adversarial in nature . . . .  
In the ordinary context of civil litigation in which the government is not a party, an adversarial relation 
does not exist between the government and a private litigant.”).  That is, an attorney initiating a civil 
lawsuit against a private party is not in a position adverse to the government, so such an attorney can be 
a state actor. 
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mental body [a jury], having no attributes of a private actor.”100  In the 
same way, the threat of a default judgment and the consequent enforcement 
of a default judgment is a traditional function of government.101  The Court 
also stated in Edmonson that “[t]he fact that the government delegates 
some portion of this power [jury selection] to private litigants does not 
change the governmental character of the power exercised . . . . [W]hen 
private litigants participate in the selection of jurors, they serve an impor-
tant function within the government and act with its substantial assis-
tance.”102  So, too, as in West, when the state “privatizes” part of a gov-
ernmental function, actors in such a privatized system can be considered to 
be exercising state power.103 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Not all attorneys function in a free market.  Attorneys who file law-
suits, in particular, can by simply filing a complaint at their unfettered dis-
cretion, immediately subject defendants to the threat of a default judgment 
and necessitate their spending money and resources toward their defense.  
That dynamic results in a form of extortion according to which a defendant 
will be made to pay any amount to the plaintiff in settlement provided the 
settlement demanded is less than the costs of defense and the attorneys’ 
costs for filing the case are minimal, as they universally are.  While his-
torically severe restrictions were placed on attorneys’ influence, to limit 
the potential for abusive lawsuits, a series of developments have led to a 
situation in which, today, we live under a regime of rules that encourages 
the filing of lawsuits and does little to restrain them, even as recent Su-
preme Court precedents have sustained the notion that attorneys are not 
purely private actors. 
This article does not argue that any particular regulation of attorneys is 
appropriate.  It does, however, argue that attorneys who file lawsuits and 
thereby trigger the authority of the state and, through the state, the threat of 
a default judgment, are qualitatively different from other private actors.  
Consequently, attorneys who file lawsuits are more appropriately subject to 
regulation than are other private actors who simply seek to sell products to 
  
 100. 500 U.S. at 624. 
 101. See id. at 625 (“[I]n all jurisdictions a true verdict will be incorporated in a judgment enforce-
able by the court.  These are traditional functions of government, not of a select, private group beyond 
the reach of the Constitution.”). 
 102. Id. at 626, 628. 
 103. 487 U.S. at 42. 
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willing buyers in a free market system.  That understanding prevailed 
through much of American history, and it should again today. 
 
